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Despite the best efforts of software developers, we continue to discover mistakes in IT products. Often
these mistakes are security vulnerabilities that, unfortunately, attackers can exploit to steal information or to disrupt
operations. What should we do when these mistakes are found?
Ideally, we could keep these mistakes secret until they are corrected and all the users have installed the corrections.
The window of opportunity for attackers would be closed before they knew the window was even open. Wouldn’t it
be great to tell the “good” people so that they can correct the problem but not tell the “bad” people so they can’t use
them for nefarious purposes?
That would be ideal, but ideal isn’t possible in this scenario. While it may sound easy, it is far from it for four main
reasons. First, the separation between “good” and “bad” isn’t black and white; there are many shades of gray.
Differentiation between who should and who shouldn’t know about a vulnerability depends on context, perspective,
timing, etc. Second, even if clear delineation could be made about who to tell, once information is out to anyone, it is
difficult to keep secret. Third, it can take considerable time to deploy countermeasures and to diffuse corrections to
all affected systems. Attackers won’t wait. Finally, some attackers may have already discovered the vulnerability
independently and know that the window is open.
As a result, there is an inherent tension in disclosure. When a security problem is discovered in software, what
should the discoverer do?
One option is that the discoverer could publicly tell everyone about the vulnerability as quickly as possible. This is
termed full or immediate disclosure. The benefit of this approach is that that security professionals and end users
know that they need to implement countermeasures and corrections. However, the unfortunate side effect is that
potential attackers also learn about the vulnerability (if they didn’t already discover it on their own) and can then use
the information to attack the affected systems.
Alternatively, the discoverer could tell the software vendor and/or security vendors discretely before widely telling
everyone else. This is termed limited or coordinated disclosure. The hope is that corrections and countermeasures
get a head start before potential attackers are alerted to the weakness. But without public pressure, this approach
may mask the urgency to resolve weaknesses.
Our recent research studies exactly this tension. We use a log of 2.4 billion information security alerts from intrusion
detection systems installed at 960 firms to quantify the effects of each disclosure method. We find that full disclosure
accelerates the diffusion of attacks and increases the risk and penetration of attacks based on the vulnerability. The
aggregate number of attacks is about the same for both disclosure methods; however, attack activity starts sooner
when fully disclosed but also ends sooner.
Despite the evidence of accelerated attacks, the result does not necessarily support a conclusion that limited
disclosure is preferable. The sooner end of attacks is insightful. Attackers abandon attacks when they are no longer
effective and move on to exploit other vulnerabilities. The finding that attackers abandon earlier indicates that full
disclosure accelerates the deployment of countermeasures as well. The countermeasures reduce the effectiveness
of the attacks, helping bring an end to attacks.
A realistic interpretation of our findings is not that limited disclosure is the best path but instead that our research
quantifies the tradeoff in full disclosure, informing security researchers and professionals. Knowing the results of full
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disclosure should allow security professionals and users to plan for and manage the inevitable security
vulnerabilities as they are found. Additionally, increased emphasis on the Internet of Things will exacerbate these
issues.
Beyond our specific security context, the question of disclosure comes up in many other areas. Should a scientist
who discovers a way to create a deadly disease or engineer a new weapon publish the results? Should people who
realize weaknesses in airport security keep it to themselves? One important consideration in grappling with these
questions is the differential effect across society. Weaker, poorer, or less sophisticated parts of the population may
bear more of the brunt of these decisions than other parts of the population. Furthermore, timing of disclosure is also
an important consideration; at times when people involved in protection are already overburdened, the beneficial
defensive effects of disclosure may be diminished relative to the potential detrimental effects on the attackers.
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Notes:
This article is based on the authors’ paper Information Disclosure and the Diffusion of Information Security
Attacks, Information Systems Research journal, Volume 26, Issue 3, September 2015. 
This post gives the views of its authors, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
Economics.
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